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Abstract 
In this letter we assess the impact of adopting a transnational supervisor on the resilience of large 
and complex banks, exploring the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 
2014. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we compare the performance of SSM banks 
vis-à-vis other banks with a similar size and complexity. Our results suggest that the adoption of a 
transnational supervisor can improve the resilience of large and complex banks, particularly for 
those operating in countries with larger banking sectors, higher market concentration and higher 
supervisory discretion.  
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1. Introduction 
While the main goal of banking supervision is arguably universal (i.e., to ensure the soundness of 
banks and the banking system), the way in which to attain it, and subsequent outcomes, can differ 
substantially across countries (Barth et al., 2004; Cihák et al., 2012; Tabak et al., 2016) – begging 
the question: would it be more effective to establish a common, transnational supervisor for large 
and complex banks, rather than the current ‘one country, one supervisor’ approach?  
On one hand, a transnational supervisor could be expected to implement regulation in a 
more coherent and effective manner across jurisdictions, namely by ensuring a better grasp of 
cross-border activities (Duijm & Schoenmaker, 2021), implementing best practices (Cuong & 
Pahm, 2021), fending off government pressures (Calomiris & Haber, 2014) and handling complex 
crisis cases (Véron, 2007). On the other hand, a transnational (and therefore more distant) 
supervisor may tend to follow “prescriptive supervisory rules (…) leaving little room for a 
judgement-led style of supervision” that considers material national idiosyncrasies (Ferran & 
Vabis, 2013: p.265). As such, whether or not implementing a transnational banking supervisor 
pays off seems an important and eminently empirical question. 
In this letter we analyze the effects of establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) in the end of 2014, after which the ECB became the direct supervisor of large and complex 
banks headquartered in Euro Area countries. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we 
compare the performance of SSM banks vis-à-vis banks that, having a similar size and complexity 
to SSM banks, remained under the supervision of national authorities during the entire sample 
period as they were headquartered outside the Euro Area (European non-SSM banks). Our results 
suggest that the adoption of a transnational supervisor can improve the resilience of large and 
complex banks, particularly of those operating in countries with larger banking sectors, higher 
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market concentration and higher supervisory discretion. 
2. Recent empirical literature 
Several studies have addressed the effects of the establishment of the SSM on the banking sector, 
focusing on a variety of phenomena such as the stock market reaction in terms of excess returns 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Loipersberger, 2018) and CDS ‘bank-sovereign’ contagion (Sáiz et al., 
2019), or income smoothing (Osma et al., 2019). Our study draws closer to the works of Fiordelisi 
et al. (2017) and Avignone et al. (2021), which empirically investigate the impact of the launch of 
the SSM on bank riskiness by employing a differences-in-differences approach. In particular, both 
studies focus exclusively on Euro Area banks: the treated banks are significant institutions that fall 
under the direct supervision of the ECB (SIs) and the control banks are the less significant 
institutions which remain under the supervision of national authorities (LSIs). The findings 
obtained by Fiordelisi et al. (2017) suggest that, since the establishment of the SSM, SIs reduced 
their lending significantly more than LSIs, while recording a higher capitalization growth; whereas 
Avignone et al. (2021) document that SIs significantly reduced credit risk when compared to LSIs. 
In our view, however, concerns may be raised on whether the use of small and often retail-oriented 
banks (LSIs) as a counterfactual to the riskiness of large and complex banks (SIs). On this point, 
an increasing body literature has shown that the drivers of riskiness seem to significantly differ 
across business models (e.g., Marques & Alves, 2021), suggesting that a different approach may 
be more adequate to gauge this important question. 
3. Data and methodology 
In contrast to the cited literature, in our analysis we compare the performance of banks under the 
direct supervision of the ECB (SSM banks) with banks of a similar size and complexity located in 
other European countries (non-SSM banks). The sample of SSM banks is based on the list of 
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significant institutions published by the ECB in the end of 2014. The non-SSM sample consists of 
banks that are headquartered in European countries outside the Euro Area, with total assets above 
€30bln or among the 3 largest banks in each country. For both samples, we retained the banks with 
full data coverage in the Moody’s Analytics BankFocus dataset for at least 3 out of the 4 years of 
each sub-period (2011-2014 and 2015-18). The final sample consists of 148 banks: 81 SSM and 
67 non-SSM. The distribution of banks per country can be found in Table A1.  
We assess the impact of the establishment of the SSM on bank riskiness by estimating the 
following differences-in-differences model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝐵𝑈𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝐵𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
wherein 𝑌𝑖𝑡
  is the outcome variable, including the Z-score, the sub-elements of Z-score 
(capital ratio and ROA) and the sub-elements of ROA (interest income, interest expenses, net 
interest income, net fees and commissions, net trading income, other income, staff expenses, 
administrative expenses, loan loss provisions)3; 𝛼0 is the model constant; 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑖 is a dummy which 
takes on the value 1 if bank 𝑖 falls under the supervision of the ECB; 𝐵𝑈𝑡 is a dummy which 
identifies if year 𝑡 belongs to the post-Banking Union period (2015-18); the remaining right-side 
variables are bank controls used in literature (size, income diversification, customer deposits, gross 
loans customers, and non-performing loans), which are divided by total assets except size (log of 
total assets); 𝐵𝑖 is a dummy to control for unobserved time-invariant confounders at the bank-
level; β and δ are the regression coefficients; and εi,t is the disturbance term. All variables (left and 
right-side) are transformed using the natural logarithm.  
 
3 All left side variables are risk-adjusted, i.e., divided by the standard deviation of ROA for the full period. 
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As required by the differences-in-differences approach (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009), 
Figure 1 shows a parallel trend in the evolution of the main outcome variable (Z-score) for both 
groups of banks (SSM and non-SSM) prior to the establishment of the SSM.  
Figure 1. Evolution of the Z-score prior to the establishment of the SSM 
 
 
Notes: Z-score weighted by total assets, in SSM and non-SSM countries. 
 
In order to check whether our baseline results are sensitive to market and institutional 
factors, we compare the main coefficient of interest (𝛽1) for sub-samples of banks that, in the pre-
Banking Union period, operated in countries with (i) large vs small banking sectors, (ii) high vs 
low market concentration, (iii) high vs low quality of institutional environment, and (iv) high vs 
low supervisory discretion. The countries are separated using the median value of the following 
dimensions, respectively: (i) ratio of total assets held by banks in our sample to GDP, (ii) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database), (iii) sum 
of scores for Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, 
Government Effectiveness and Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (Barth et al., 
2004); and (iv) level of supervisory options and national discretions for each country as assessed 
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4. Results 
The results in Table 1 suggest that prior to the Banking Union (2011-14) SSM banks recorded a 
significantly higher distance-to-distress than non-SSM banks did, mainly due to higher levels of 
risk-adjusted capitalization. On the profitability side, however, no significant difference emerged, 
as the higher net margin of SSM banks was offset by a lower ability to generate trading income 
and higher risk costs. As for the post Banking Union period (2015-16), the distance-to-distress gap 
increased further between SSM and non-SSM banks, backed by a significant difference also in 
profitability – steaming from an increase in the generation of fees and commissions that more than 
covered the higher operating expenses. In general, these results are in line with the differences-in-
differences regressions reported in Table 2, which also indicate that in the post-Banking Union 
period SSM banks benefitted from lower funding costs. 
Table 1. Comparison of means 
 Pre-Banking Union Post-Banking Union 
 SSM Non-SSM Diff. SSM Non-SSM Diff. 
Z-score 42.6 33.4 9.2*** 52.7 42.1 10.6*** 
Risk-adj. Total equity 46.5 31.7 14.8** 56.0 40.0 16.0*** 
Risk-adj. ROA 1.81 1.71 0.10 2.81 2.10 0.71*** 
Net interest income 1.15 0.96 0.18*** 1.19 0.98 0.21*** 
Net fees & commissions 0.45 0.47 -0.02 0.49 0.44 0.05* 
Net trading income 0.13 0.28 -0.15*** 0.14 0.26 -0.12*** 
Other income 0.34 0.15 0.19*** 0.31 0.15 0.15*** 
Staff expenses 0.66 0.64 0.02 0.69 0.62 0.07*** 
Administrative expenses 0.73 0.63 0.10*** 0.72 0.66 0.06** 
Loan loss provisions 0.42 0.24 0.18*** 0.25 0.09 0.15*** 
Notes: Weighted mean values. Z-score, risk-adjusted total equity and ROA are computed using the standard deviation 
of ROA for the full sample period as the denominator; the remaining variables are computed as percentage of total assets. 
Variables winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. we compute Welch’s t-test for the comparison of weighted means (Pasek, 
2020). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
We highlight three aspects possibly underlying these results. Firstly, the superior 
profitability of SSM banks in in the post-Banking Union period may reflect the fact that the SSM 
has adopted profitability and business model sustainability as a key supervisory priority since its 
onset (e.g., ECB, 2016). Secondly, the higher operating costs of SSM banks could reflect the 
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compliance costs (e.g., IT and specialized staff) stemming from tighter supervisory requirements 
on internal controls and reporting (Ayadi et al, 2016); on the other hand, in the current context of 
staff and branch reduction, such cost add-ons may reflect the efforts to digitalize business 
processes and one-shot expenses with voluntary retirement schemes. Finally, the focus on reducing 
non-performing exposures, via sales or securitizations, could explain the overall reduction in the 
cost of risk.  
Table 2. Baseline regressions: Z-score decomposition 
 








SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.079*** -0.235*** -0.486*** -0.029* 
Size -1.176*** -1.154*** -1.167* -0.215 -0.254 -0.388*** 
Income diversification 0.078*** 0.057*** 0.059*** -0.008 -0.024 -0.052** 
Customer deposits 0.065 0.000 0.117* -0.302** -0.637*** 0.212*** 
Gross loans to customers 0.030 0.046 -0.007 0.728*** 0.598*** 0.133*** 
Non-performing loans -0.074*** -0.016 -0.079*** 0.116*** 0.445** 0.004 
       
Observations  1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 
R-square 0.353 0.366 0.095 0.419 0.308 0.211 
 












SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.015* 0.010 0.011 0.045** 0.051* -0.004 
Size -0.247*** 0.009 -0.162*** -0.530* -1.275*** -0.009 
Income diversification 0.010 0.085*** 0.053*** 0.002 0.057* 0.001 
Customer deposits 0.007 -0.018 -0.061* -0.012 -0.063 -0.011 
Gross loans to customers 0.075*** 0.013 -0.012 0.216*** 0.029 0.008* 
Non-performing loans 0.016* 0.017 0.028** 0.014 0.036 0.034*** 
       
Observations  1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 
R-square 0.131 0.035 0.063 0.134 0.254 0.011 
Notes: OLS regressions with bank fixed effects and controls. All dependent variables are risk-adjusted (i.e., divided by the 
standard deviation of ROA for the full sample period). Both dependent and independent variables are transformed using natural 
log, except for total assets for which we use log10. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Next, we check for heterogenous effects of the establishment of the SSM for banks 
operating in different market and institutional settings. Indeed, the results in Table 3 show that the 
positive effect of the SSM on distance-to-distress is significantly higher for banks operating in 
countries with larger banking systems and higher market concentration – suggesting that a 
transnational supervisor may be better able to resist government pressures (Calomiris & Haber, 
2014). As for the institutional setting, while we do not find any significant difference in the impact 
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of SSM for banks operating in countries with different institutional quality, such difference does 
emerge when considering the level of supervisory discretion. Namely, the results suggest that the 
SSM was more beneficial for banks operating with high supervisory discretion – which we 
interpret as evidence that transnational supervision indeed allows the implementation of 
harmonized, best supervisory practices across countries. 
Table 3. Sensitivity analyses 
 High Low Diff. 
Panel A: Size of banking sector (total assets of SIs to GDP) 
SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.271*** 0.173*** 0.098** 
Observations  597 574  
R-square 0.457 0.248  
    
Panel B: Market concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 
SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.256*** 0.173*** 0.083** 
Observations  566 605  
R-square 0.352 0.371  
    
Panel C: Quality of institutional environment 
SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.164*** 0.221*** -0.057 
Observations  633 538  
R-square 0.409 0.320  
    
Panel D: Supervisory discretion (options and national discretions) 
SSM*Post-Banking Union 0.272*** 0.125*** 0.147*** 
Observations  571 443  
R-square 0.435 0.204  
Notes: OLS regressions with bank fixed effects and controls on sub-samples (above or below median), computed using 
four country-level variables: in Panel A, the ratio of total assets held by banks in our sample to GDP; in Panel B, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (World Bank, Global Financial Development Database); in Panel C, the sum of scores for 
Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness and 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (Barth et al., 2004); in Panel D, the level of supervisory options 
and national discretions for each country as assessed by CEBS (2008a, 2008b) (Panel D). The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the natural log of Z-score. For brevity reasons, only the coefficient of the main independent variable is 
reported. In the last column we compute the Chi-Square Test for the equality of coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The heterogeneity of supervisory practices and outcomes across countries has fueled the debate 
over the costs and benefits of transnational supervision. Using the establishment of the SSM as 
empirical setting, we compare the distance to distress of large and complex banks under the direct 
supervision of the ECB with similarly large and complex banks operating outside the SSM. Our 
results suggest that since its establishment the SSM has been relatively successful in increasing 
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the resilience of supervised entities, particularly for those operating in countries with larger 
banking sectors, higher market concentration and higher supervisory discretion. In our view, these 
results may be interpreted as suggesting that transnational supervision seems to bear a superior 
ability to fend off government pressures and harmonize best supervisory practices. 
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Table A1. Distribution of banks per country 
SSM #Banks  Non-SSM #Banks 
Austria 4  Bulgaria 3 
Belgium 4  Croatia 3 
Estonia 2  Czech Republic 3 
Finland 1  Denmark 4 
France 10  Hungary 3 
Germany 15  Liechtenstein 3 
Greece 2  Norway 2 
Ireland 4  Poland 5 
Italy 7  Romania 2 
Latvia 3  Sweden 6 
Luxembourg 2  Switzerland 7 
Malta 2  United Kingdom 26 
Netherlands 6    
Portugal 3    
Slovak Republic 3    
Slovenia 3    
Spain 10    
Total 81  Total 67 
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